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Summary 
The FP6 TOCSIN project has evaluated climate change mitigation options in China and 
India and the conditions for strategic cooperation on research, development and 
demonstration (RD&D) and technology transfer with the European Union. In particular, the 
project investigated the strategic dimensions of RD&D cooperation and the challenge of 
creating incentives to encourage the participation of developing countries in post-2012 
GHG emissions reduction strategies and technological cooperation. This paper summarizes 
the main policy-relevant results of the project, including the requests for: (I) almost 
immediate decisions on ambitious mitigation; (II) a strong increase in Annex I support 
regarding R&D spending and technology transfer; (III) a well-designed mix of instruments 
and targets in an effective climate deal that addresses manifold national interests and 
concerns. 
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The FP6 TOCSIN project has evaluated climate change mitigation options in China and 
India and the conditions for strategic cooperation on research, development and 
demonstration (RD&D) and technology transfer with the European Union. In particular, the 
project investigated the strategic dimensions of RD&D cooperation and the challenge of 
creating incentives to encourage the participation of developing countries in post-2012 
GHG emissions reduction strategies and technological cooperation. This paper 
summarizes the main policy-relevant results of the project, including the requests for: (I) 
almost immediate decisions on ambitious mitigation; (II) a strong increase in Annex I 
support regarding R&D spending and technology transfer; (III) a well-designed mix of 
instruments and targets in an effective climate deal that addresses manifold national 
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GHG emissions reduction strategies and technological cooperation. This paper 




We investigated the possibility and consequences of a 3.5 W/m2 radiative forcing 
scenario. Under this scenario, the goal of limiting global temperature increase to 2 degrees 
compared to pre-industrial times may be reached, provided that the climate sensitivity is 
moderate (see figure 1). However, a 3.5 W/m2 by no means guarantees that the 2 degree 
goal will be met if the climate sensitivity is found to be high. According to tolerable window 
simulations with the bottom-up integrated assessment model TIAM, the corresponding 
concentration of Long Lived GHGs is 535 ppm-CO2eq and 430 ppm for CO2 only, at the 




Figure 1: Greenhouse gases and global warming - Simulations with TIAM 
 2.2  Necessary emission reductions 
 
As regards the CO2 emissions, the 3.5 W/m2 target requires a 50%-65% reduction of 
global emissions by the end of the century compared to 2000 emissions. Global CO2 
emissions have to be reduced by 28%-35% by 2050 according to TIAM and WITCH, 
respectively, cuts within the range given by the IPCC (-30% to -60%).  
The cost, represented by the loss of surplus in TIAM and GWP losses in WITCH, 
increases more than 4-5 fold with the 3.5 W/m2 target compared to a 4.5 W/m2 target. 
This illustrates the severity of the 3.5 W/m2 goal. The corresponding net present value of 
the cost represents 1.3%-1.5% of the net present value of GDP over the period 2005 to 
2100, according to the two models. To put this cost into perspective: real GDP is assumed 
to increase by 415% or more, depending on the model over the century.  
It is also important to keep in mind that some countries - for example, the Alliance of Small 
Island States - and experts - for example, the NASA Chief Scientist James Hansen - are 
campaigning for even more ambitious targets in temperature terms 1.5-1.7ºC. 
 
As a 3.5 W/m2 scenario will require very dramatic emission reductions, not just in future 
decades but almost immediately, TIAM simulations indicate that China and India will both 
need to begin to see large scale penetration of carbon capture and storage (CCS) by 
2015-2020. Considering the lags associated between a decision to build a new power 
station and it coming online, the decisions needed for deployment by 2020 must be taken 
almost immediately in order to see any perceptible change in overall generation mix and to 
have an impact on near term emission trajectories.  
 
Currently, there is a single CCS project underway in China, while there are no serious 
proposals to date in India. This single project places China as a global leader because of 
delays in the implementation elsewhere. However, since China has averaged over 50GW 
of new coal capacity per year, China will need dozens of similar projects to be announced 
and completed within the next five to ten years to have any discernible impact on Chinese 
electricity generation and carbon dioxide emissions.  India has announced plans for 
numerous “ultra mega” supercritical pulverised coal units of 4GW in the next few years, 
with no immediate plans for even a CCS demonstration project.     
 
In addition, 3.5 W/m2 scenarios require major technology breakthroughs outside the 
electricity sector, which points to another major challenge. In simulations with the coupled 
GEMINI-TIAM bottom-up/top-down model, limiting the sector coverage in non-OECD 
countries to the electricity sector makes infeasible the limitation of the World radiative 
forcing to 3.5 W/m2. The smallest feasible radiative forcing would be 3.8 W/m2. 
Similarly, analysis performed with WITCH shows that if R&D programs fail in bringing 
down costs of alternative technologies in the non-electricity sector then policy costs could 
increase by 60 up to 80%. 3  The role of China, India, and other emerging economies 
3.1  General considerations 
 
Leading emerging economies, including China and India, are mainly powered by coal
1
.  
China and India have been facing increasing pressure in climate change negotiations as 
they are among the main emitters of greenhouse gases, China being the largest emitter 
already today and India just having climbed to third place. India currently accounts for five 
percent of global emissions compared to 20 percent for the US and for China. In the 
future, China is very likely to dominate global emissions with a share of up to almost 50% 
in the reference case. The same percentage holds for future reductions under a 3.5 W/m2 
scenario, if we assume an efficient allocation of abatement across countries. The 
contribution by India is far less high, with up to 11% of future global emissions and 16% of 
future global reductions under a 3.5 W/m2 scenario.  
 
Simulations with WITCH show that delaying participation of major developing countries in 
a meaningful climate agreement until 2030 might increase costs to an extent that 
ambitious targets become infeasible (Bosetti et al., 2009). Despite this, most developing 
countries, including India and China, argue against emission caps for their countries in the 
near future. Differences in ability to pay, historical responsibility and per capita emissions 
provide strong arguments for this. What is more, China argues that the emission intensive 
productions driven by developed countries’ consumption have significantly contributed to 
China’s recent years’ emission surge. 
 
However, while the efficient allocation is the global least cost distribution of abatement 
action, the distribution of costs can instead match other fairness principle through the use 
of financial transfers. Indeed, the high reductions of emissions in China do not necessarily 
mean that China will or should pay for these reductions. The Clean Development 
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, or any other technology-oriented agreement between 
countries X and Y would be a way for country X to pay for the mitigation actions 
implemented in country Y. In the absence of such agreements, developing countries bear 
an important part of the worldwide cost of the climate policy, according to simulations with 
the coupled GEMINI-TIAM model. 
 
India and China are two key players when it comes to the discussion of whether sharing 
efforts in an efficient manner or following some principle of fairness. In particular, India and 
China are two very different nations, both in terms of emissions and GDP per capita, 
hence it is beneficial for the discussion to think of their contribution and their commitment 
separately.   
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 Emissions from power plants still account for more than half of the CO2 emissions of these countries, although this 
share will be reduced by the rising importance of other emission sources, especially in China. 
 3.2  India 
 
India is the third largest emitter of greenhouse gases, but not a major emitter in per capita 
terms. India emits about 1.1 tonnes of CO2 per capita while the corresponding figure for 
the US is more than 20 tonnes. India faces major development challenges - access to the 
basic amenities like drinking water, electricity, sanitation and clean cooking energy still 
remains a luxury for both urban and rural dwellers alike.  
 
Although India has been building a reputation for intransigence on climate change, on the 
17th of September 2009 the Indian Environment Minister said that India is ready to 
quantify the amount of planet-warming gas emissions it could cut with domestic actions to 
fight climate change, but will not accept internationally binding targets. The Integrated 
Energy Policy Roadmap 2006 (endorsed and accepted in 2009), links the energy sector to 
the goals of sustainable development by policies that promote efficiency and reflect 
externalities associated with energy consumption. Further in June 2008, the Prime Minister 
of India released India’s first National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) outlining 
existing and future policies and programmes addressing climate mitigation and 
adaptation2.  Emphasising the importance of high economic growth rates, the plan 
identifies measures that promote our development objectives while also yielding co-
benefits for addressing climate change effectively.5 It says these national measures would 
be more successful with assistance from developed countries, and pledges that India per 
capita greenhouse gas emissions will at no point exceed that of developed countries even 
as we pursue our development objectives.” Prior to Copenhagen, India announced to 




China is willing to collaborate on projects to enhance energy efficiency and green energy 
technology developments. A clear message can be discerned, besides ‘no binding 
commitments in post 2012’, that their attitudes can be changed step-wise according to the 
amount of financial supports and transfer of core technology elements (e.g. design, 
production of key elements and maintenance) they could potentially receive from Annex I 
countries. China’s Vice Premier Li Keqiang said that we should be aware of the severity 
and urgency of coping with climate change and that the U.S. and China were well 
positioned to work together on climate change, despite different national situations and 
development stages. Recent domestic policies also indicate that a change in attitudes is 
already underway: China has announced before Copenhagen that the country’s carbon 
                                                 
2
 The plan identifies eight core “national missions” running through 2017 and directed respective ministries to submit detailed 
implementation plans to the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change. Among other things, it mandates the retirement of old 
inefficient coal-fired power plants and supports R&D in Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) and super-critical 
technologies. It also envisages initiatives like renewable portfolio standards for all states and mandatory energy audits for energy 
intensive industries. A new Climate Science Research Fund is envisaged that supports activities like climate modeling, increased 
international collaboration, and private sector initiatives to develop adaptation and mitigation technologies. 
 intensity should be reduced by 40% - 45%from 2005 to 2020 China has also been raising 
exports taxes for three times in about 13 months since the end of 2006 on certain carbon 




Spending on energy R&D has significantly declined since the 1980s. What is more, to date 
only a small part of energy R&D is related to low carbon technologies. The CDM has had 
only a very limited effect on low carbon technology transfer, yet it is to date the most 
important mechanism designed for that purpose.  
 
It has been widely recognized in the negotiations that significant change is needed in this 
field. The Bali Action Plan sets technology as one of the four negotiation tracks, next to 
mitigation, adaptation, and finance. There have been numerous recent proposals to 
dramatically expand technology transfer and R&D cooperation to address climate change. 
For example, G77 & China submitted a proposal in 2008 for a “Technology Mechanism 
under the UNFCCC”, focusing on enabling environments, intellectual property rights, 
capacity building, and meeting incremental cost. EU Environment Commissioner Stavros 
Dimas has suggested that the EU might contribute R&D funding up to 15 billion to 
developing countries by 2020, with an additional 13 billion coming from the United States 
and 4.5 billion from Japan (Harrison, 2009).  
 
Several lines of research within TOCSIN also strengthen the case for addressing 
innovation and spillovers in climate policy (Verdolini and Galeotti, 2009; Bosetti et al., 
2008). 
 
The actual evolution of investment in recent years gives fewer grounds for optimism. In 
spite of strong continued growth in trade in goods and services, bilateral investment is 
actually going in the wrong direction.  EU investment in China fell from €7.1 billion in 2007 
to €4.5 billion in 2008. Chinese investment in Europe decreased even more dramatically, 
from 2.2 billion in 2006 to €616 million in 2007 and €71 million in 2008 (EC, 2009).   
 
One of the main reasons for the slow transfer is the ongoing debate over intellectual 
property rights (IPR) of climate friendly technologies between developed countries and 
developing countries. One side of debate (largely developing countries) argues that IPR 
associated with low-carbon technologies should be bought up by an international fund and 
made freely available. The other side (led by developed countries) argues that the 
emerging economies should first tighten up their legal frameworks to better protect IPR 
before large scale transfers can be put in place. Such conflicts have almost resulted in the 
failure of previous international negotiations; for example the debate between China and 
other developing countries with the US nearly led to the failure of the Bali agenda. On the 
other hand, China´s position regarding IPR on low carbon technologies is starting to change, because China is becoming a technology leader in some sectors. For example, 
recent negotiations have revealed that China is no longer much in favour of a global 
license system for technologies.  
 
The flow of resources and technology from North to South has become a linchpin in 
determining the success of the current round of climate change negotiations although the 
ambitious goals will be difficult to realise. Licensing advanced technology is undeniably 
likely to facilitate significant transfers of resources and technology, but concerns over 
international competitiveness make such proposals politically fraught. Given the current 
economic downturn, the relatively stronger position of many emerging economies and 
lingering competitiveness concerns because of large trade deficits with emerging 
economies,  developed economies may be inclined to limiting the resource flow to 
emerging economies such as China and India. Nevertheless, the importance of technology 
development and diffusion and of Chinese and Indian engagement in mitigation efforts 
makes a dramatic increase in technology and resource transfers inevitable if there is to be 
an effective international climate agreement. 
4.2  Technology­oriented Agreements 
 
Elements of technology-oriented agreements (TOAs) can be knowledge sharing, joint 
research programs, collaborative programs for large-scale demonstration, arrangements 
on intellectual property rights, technology transfer, capacity building, technology standards, 
and incentive mechanisms for technology development and diffusion. 
 
The usual idea behind any kind of sectoral technology policy is to correct specific market 
failures and overcome barriers that prevent the large scale development and diffusion of 
promising low carbon technologies. Barriers are especially high in developing countries, 
where lack of credit, information gaps, lack of absorptive capacity, energy subsidies, and 
public inefficiency constitute severe obstacles to technology diffusion. If technology-
oriented agreements are tailored to overcome the specific barriers that a given low carbon 
technology faces, they are likely to contribute to effective mitigation. 
 
On the other hand, technology policy is criticised, because it requires government 
intervention in the choice of technologies. While wrong private choices are corrected under 
market competition, wrong choices by governments can become very costly for society. 
For international technology-oriented agreements, there is the additional risk that the more 
powerful countries exercise their power to push forward the technologies which they have 
a competitive advantage in. Obviously, these technologies do not need to be the best or 
most cost-effective.  
 
For these reasons, TOAs are unlikely to be a good replacement for a global cap and trade 
system, because the latter is more consistent in setting global targets and incentives. 
However, a global cap and trade system is far from being implemented. In this situation, 
TOAs offer opportunities for engaging major developing countries in mitigation efforts or even  – in more general terms – for engaging big emitters in emission reduction 
agreements (de Coninck, 2009). When these big emitters are industrialized countries, 
TOAs can offer them opportunities for exploiting first mover advantages in the 
commercialisation of low carbon technologies. When the big emitters are developing 
countries, they can profit from favourable conditions for adopting advanced low carbon 
technologies. In general, TOAs can offer benefits to big emitters which pure emission 
reduction commitments cannot. This is an important advantage, considering that the 
environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol has suffered from lacking or insufficient 
involvement of big emitters, notably of the USA and China.  
 
Currently, negotiations about technology benefit from an important psychological 
advantage over negotiations on emission reductions: Technology is associated with 
innovation, export opportunities, development and growth, while emission reductions are 
associated with costs. These attributes may change as TOAs that achieve significant 
emission reductions come at a cost as well. Developed and emerging nations are more 
equal in technology than in most other fields, with countries like China and Brazil 
pioneering in the commercialisation of important low carbon technologies. This could be an 
advantage when negotiating TOAs.  
 
With a view on COP15 at Copenhagen, developing countries demand to first negotiate on 
support, then on action. Elements of support to be negotiated are financing and 
technology. Negotiations on financing can be expected to be extremely difficult, while the 




There are three flaws in current CDM implementation. Firstly, many CDM projects are not 
“additional”, which means that many projects registered under the CDM would have been 
built anyway, but allow industrialised countries to emit more. It is estimated that 75% of all 
approved CDM projects were already up and running at the time they were approved 
(Friends of Earth, 2009).  
 
Secondly, many CDM projects do not entail technology diffusion. It has been estimated 
that on a global scale, only about half of the current CDM projects comprise some kind of 
technology transfer. This is also true for China and India. For example, 16% of the CDM 
reductions in China originate from about 700 hydropower projects. Half of all new 
hydropower capacity being built in China is in the CDM pipeline. Although hydropower is a 
low carbon technology, the fact is that China is far more advanced than many developed 
countries in building and running hydropower plants. Furthermore, HFC-23 emission 
abatement accounts for a large share of the CDM reductions (65% in India and 40% in 
China, see Figure 2). While the first projects of this kind typically claim some kind of 
technology transfer, the dominance of this project type indicates a lack of diversification 
also in terms of technology.   
Figure 2: Percentage of 
CDM emission reductions by project type in China and India  
 
Thirdly, the scale of the current CDM is small, and its effective scope is limited to a few 
sectors. Many CDM projects in China have been developed in the power industry. Still, 
they account for less than 1% of total installed capacity in this industry. China as well as 
India expect much more financial and technological support from developed countries to 
tackle the emissions from their coal-dominated power industries. Furthermore, the CDM 
has proven to be ineffective in reducing emissions from end use sectors such as 
transportation and households. 
 
If a new post-2012 CDM is to be effective on a much larger scale, it needs to address end 
use sectors and to consider continuity and sustainability of low carbon technologies 
development and spillovers. For example, developed countries could provide the initial 
funding and technology to start a low-carbon project, while China or India implement 
domestic policies to develop the project to larger scale. Furthermore, BRIC countries, like 
China or India, can play a valuable role not only in absorbing advanced technologies from 
the West, but also in creating further spillovers by technology diffusion to other developing 
countries, including LDCs and LLDCs (Guan and Reiner, forthcoming), with the necessary 




It is well known that an international ETS is an efficient instrument for reducing the costs of 
mitigation. Simulations with GEMINI-TIAM show that also developing countries that have 
the capacity to implement such a scheme can profit from an international ETS, at least if 
they receive a sufficiently large allocation of emission rights. Despite this, it would be more 
than difficult to make China or India accept a binding commitment on climate change 
mitigation in the near term. Neither China nor India have expressed any official interest in 
cap and trade and both countries remain opposed to putting binding commitments for 
developing countries on the agenda, which would be a necessary step for engaging in cap 
and trade. In China, which has substantial government involvement in technology 
development, government officials consider large scale market orientated mechanisms risky, which includes a cap and trade system.  
 
However, it might be possible for China or India to implement interregional ETS within the 
country. India and China are very large countries with great regional disparities. Many 
regions like Beijing, Shanghai, Delhi or Mumbai are well developed. Implementing a 
domestic ETS could help China and India to accelerate technology adoption and to 
stimulate the diffusion of green technologies in relatively less developed regions. 
Furthermore, such ETS could potentially help the country in easing off regional economic 
disparities as well as accelerating the transition to a green economy. Less economically 
developed regions would receive financial and technological aid from both foreign and 
domestic channels to level their economic conditions with the richer economies. In 
addition, through domestic emissions trading, China and India could test whether they 
should fully engage in an international cap and trade system at a later date. During the 
phase of domestic trading they would build up confidence and regulatory capacity.      
5.2  R&D policies 
 
Simulations with the WITCH hybrid bottom-up/top-down model show that increased energy 
R&D spending alone is not sufficient to solve the problem of climate change. It provides no 
direct incentives for the adoption of new technologies and it focuses on the longer term, 
missing near-term opportunities for cost-effective emission reductions. A global carbon 
price signal could provide the type of incentives needed. Although not sufficient, R&D 
policies could still reduce policy costs by 10-15%. Also, financing an international R&D 
fund could improve the suboptimal regional distribution of R&D. By increasing the ability of 
developing countries to absorb innovation, it could make technology transfer more 
successful.   
5.3  Technology­oriented agreements 
 
Technology-oriented agreements (TOAs) could be an important element in finding and 
strengthening a self-enforcing climate deal. TOAs could address concerns of the biggest 
emitters and ideally make their pay-offs from a climate deal positive. However, a significant 
contribution of TOAs to solving the climate change problem can only be expected if they 
are meant to be more than good will statements, i.e. if they actually lead to significant 
emission reductions. For this, they have to include ambitious technology standards or 
mandates as well as strong incentives and considerable financing, e.g. through an 
international fund (de Coninck, 2009).  
 
Another key factor are arrangements on intellectual property rights that allow for 
widespread diffusion, yet leave sufficient incentives for research and development where 
needed. Smart decisions on these arrangements depend, among other things, on the 
maturity of the technology addressed. Many foreign companies are not motivated to 
transfer their patents and it is unfair and impractical to ask firms to share their patents 
without an appropriate compensating mechanism. Therefore, we suggest that an 
international R&D funding scheme be developed in order to design, research and share new technology. The challenge is that such cooperation has been a mainstay of 
discussions among policy elites for at least three decades. Changing attitudes towards 
climate policy could make the difference today. 
 
It is commonly recognized that the post-2012 climate policy needs to address technology 
issues much more than the Kyoto Protocol. TOAs are especially needed for key 
technologies that are known to be crucial for achieving mitigation goals, but are unlikely to 
be widely applied at a large scale under other instruments of the climate deal. Given the 
dependence of China and India on coal as well as the reluctance of both countries to 
accept binding economy-wide emission targets, carbon capture and storage (CCS) is the 
most prominent example. Furthermore, technologies that are associated with considerable 
risks and/or international negative externalities are candidates for TOAs. Examples are 
biofuels, because of their influence on food markets, and geoengineering.  
 
The main risk of the TOA approach is the emergence of a fragmented patchwork of 
agreements with reduced transparency and accountability (Benvenisti and Downs, 2007). 
TOAs cannot fully replace agreements on emission reductions. Rather they complement 
these other agreements. If designed properly, they can increase the effectiveness of the 
climate deal by fostering development and diffusion of important low carbon technologies, 
especially in countries that are not (yet) ready to accept binding emission targets. To 
prevent fragmentation, it is desirable to create an institutional link between the TOAs and 
the climate regime under the UNFCCC. One possible way of linking that is being 
discussed concerns the integration of TOAs into Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
(NAMA) of developing countries. 
5.4  Self­enforcing climate policy agreements 
 
Game theoretic simulations in TOCSIN explore allocations of emission rights between 
developing countries (including India), newly industrialised countries (including China) and 
two groups of industrialised countries under a tradable permits scheme (Drouet et al., 
forthcoming).  
 
Developing countries as well as newly industrialised countries are very sensitive to the 
allocation rules. The group of newly industrialised countries tends to be a loser of 
mitigation policies, mainly because of deteriorating terms of trade due to the decrease of 
worldwide fossil fuel energy consumption. Indeed, Russia and the Middle East countries 
are part of this group. This is why in the negotiations, these countries ask for financial 
transfers to compensate welfare losses. Among the industrialised countries, the group with 
the USA, Canada and Australia generally suffers more important welfare losses than the 
group that mainly includes the EU and Japan. These results are coherent with the 
observed positions of countries in the climate negotiation.  
 
Despite this, we show that allocations can be found which lead to a self-enforcing (i.e. 
signatory Parties comply out of self-interest), meaningful climate agreement. The corresponding allocation is fairly close to contraction and convergence (Meyer, 2004) by 
2050. Nevertheless it gives more to the group of newly industrialised countries at the 
expense of the group which includes the EU and Japan in order to equalise surplus 
variations across regions. This result shows that even if standard allocations proposed by 
literature fail to find an acceptable agreement, we can find an allocation which could 
conduce to a stable and acceptable agreement. According to our game theoretic 
simulation, this agreement has the following characteristics: 
 •    The split of tradable emission rights until 2050 is 17% for the group which includes 
USA,  Australia and Canada, 9% for the group which includes the EU and other  high-
income industrialised countries, 44% for newly industrialised countries including China, 
and 30% for developing countries including India. 
 •    It gives an overcompensation to the group of newly industrialised countries, 
compensating especially the loss of income of fossil fuel exporters. 
 •    It is rather generous to the USA, Canada and Australia to compensate their 
dependence on oil consumption. 
  •      In contrary, the allocation to the EU and Japan is slightly restrictive, taking into 
account their present energy efficiency. 
 •    Finally, the allocation of allowances to low-income developing countries is below the 
one suggested by an equal per capita emissions rule.  
 
Considering TOCSIN results that are based on 149 stakeholder interviews (Gainza et al., 
2009), it is unlikely that such a global agreement until 2050 is going to be reached anytime 
soon. Stakeholders share a very limited consensus about what will be the shape of the 
future international climate policy. This will imply, according to them, that the next period 
and nature of commitments will not be significantly different from the current one - i.e. a 
Kyoto Protocol “redux” scenario. Furthermore, they recognise that a post-2012 regime will 
depend largely on the type of commitment assumed by the U.S. Despite this, our game 
theoretic analysis shows that balancing the interests of different groups of countries is 
possible and that this is the key to making signatories of a climate agreement stick to their 
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